Tagged: prima facie

June 3, 2014

“Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’”

Source: Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).

“That the burden of persuasion never shifts is due to the relatively weak showing required of a plaintiff in order to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” — Jason R. Bent

Where a higher initial showing is made by the plaintiff, the “strong medicine” of a shift in the burden of persuasion can be justified. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

“[O]ur decisions in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute are not alien to our Title VII jurisprudence.” See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

May 24, 2014

“[Marcus Isaiah Washington] satisfies the prima facie test, with impressive qualifications (University of Miami accelerated graduation and a master’s degree by age 23) and some initial successes in the industry before working for [the William Morris Agency].” — Arbitrator David L. Gregory’s Partial Final Award, December 17, 2013. pg. 8

November 20, 2013

one of Bross’ reasons why “individual plaintiffs in Title VII actions for disparate treatment should be able to shift the burden of production by demonstrating the defendant had a pattern-and-practice of discrimination.”

The first reason why plaintiffs should be afforded the right to shift the burden of proof by using evidence of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination is that it is consistent with past case law. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court acknowledged that past cases have made it “unmistakably clear that ‘statistical [evidence has] served … an important role’ .. . in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue” and is “competent in proving employment discrimination [cases].” Furthermore, “[i]n many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of … statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer.” In a footnote, the Supreme Court explained that, “absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.”” “Statistics showing [a distinct] racial … imbalance … [provide] a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.’

Case law has supported the fact that the significance of the McDonnell Douglas method does not lie in its “specification of the discrete elements” required to prove a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas indicates “that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.”‘ Thus, “[a]s in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence,” as long as the evidence creates an inference of discrimination. As stated in Teamsters, statistics can “create a greater likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern”‘ and are a “telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.”‘ Furthermore, “proof of a discriminatory pattern and practice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief [which] is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are [normally] created.” As a result, the plaintiff should not be denied the ability to demonstrate a prima facie case solely through evidence of a pattern-and-practice.

Source: David J. Bross. The Use of Pattern-and-Practice By Individuals in Non-Class Claims. 28 Nova L. Rev. 795, 809-810. 2003-2004.