There is nothing mysterious about what judges need to do to ful­fill the legislative intent of the Restoration Act. Step one is to revive the tradition of liberal construction that used to prevail routinely. Step two is to adapt that tradition to a statute whose structure, language, and intent all point to a body of law far less concerned with preserving the prerogatives of covered entities, and far more concerned with preventing and punishing discrimination in all its manifestations (and with compensating victims of such acts), than are the counterpart federal and state statutes. Step three is to heed the specific guidance generated in connection with the passage of the Restoration Act.

Also

As has already been discussed, a court, seeking to construe a provision of the City Human Rights Law, must take account of: (a) the Council’s belief that the law has heretofore been construed too narrowly; (b) the fact that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are “uniquely broad and remedial; and (c) the Council’s intention that the law be construed “in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”

What the phrases “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” and “fundamental amendments” reflect is the fact that, in 1991, the City Human Rights Law shifted decisively away from the “let’s see if we can conciliate and become friends” philosophy that animated the first generation of modern civil rights statutes. The City Human Rights Law became instead a statute that had at its core traditional law enforcement values. These included the belief that deterrence was necessary to maximize compliance, and that deterrence could only be achieved: (a) under a regime that maximized responsibility for discriminatory acts and concurrently minimized the leeway accorded covered entities to evade such responsibility; and  (b)  where non-compliance  was seen  to  have  serious consequences.

Built into the law was the belief that a system that truly has “zero tolerance” for discrimination must punish violations severely, especially because every act of discrimination is seen to represent an injury not only to the individual victim, but to the City as a whole. Joined to this core belief in civil rights enforcement as law enforcement, and, in some respects, a function of it, was the view that the needs of victims of discrimination are sufficiently important that they trump—in all but the most limited circumstances—concerns about any burdens to be placed on covered entities.

None of the federal judges in the Southern District of New York (Castel) and Second Circuit (Lynch, Hall and Chin), or Arbitrator David L. Gregory applied, better yet mentioned, the New York City Human Rights Law or the 2005 Restoration Act in their adverse decisions against me over the last three years. Had Castel not have intentionally ignored this law to deprive me of my constitutional rights, there is no possible way he could have upheld the arbitration agreements I signed as a condition of employment with William Morris based on the arguments raised in my opposition to William Morris’ Motion to Compel Arbitration in March of 2011. For this reason and more, he and Magistrate Judge James C. Francis (who was also the magistrate judge in Rowe) have GOT TO GO due to an appearance and/or actual bias, prejudice and/or impropriety!

Source: Craig Gurian. A Return To Eyes on the Prize: Litigating Under the Restored New York City Human Rights Laws. 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 255, 281 (2006).