See, e.g., Faigman et al.,  supra  note 84, at 1399 (noting that the Court “has never held that only consciously held and explicit motives qualify under the applicable law” and that “[e]specially in light of the science, such a construction seems particularly crabbed and artificial”); Wax, supra  note 64, at 985 (stating that “what really matters, and what ought to matter, is whether people are treated worse because of their race — or other protected characteristic, such as sex — in the real world. Specifically, the focus should not be on attitudes or sympathies, but on…actionable discrimination…[D]iscrimination occurs when an individual is victimized by ill treatment that is causally linked to or based on a protected characteristic.”); Zatz,  supra  note 71,  at 1374-75 (stating that ― “[s]cholars agree that the causal definition best captures the doctrinal category of ‘disparate treatment‘”).

Source: Tristin K. Green. The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law pg. 24, footnote 94. 2011.