Tagged: federal judges
my docket still does not show the most recent pleading submitted to the Supreme Court…
Read my September 10, 2015 Application to Stay Extension to Submit Petition for Writ of Certiorari Pending Resolution of July 18, 2015 Motion to Disqualify Loeb & Loeb LLP, or in the Alternative, Application to Exceed Word Limits here:
Exhibits A thru F:
I have a confirmation from USPS that my package was delivered on Monday, September 14, 2015.
For the last two months, Cynthia Rapp and the Clerk of Court have been trying to Kim Davis me. Why would I submit a petition for a writ of certiorari if the Supreme Court cannot even follow its on procedural rules? Without procedural due process, how can I expect the Justices to impartially uphold the law?
read my Em. Motion for Reconsideration En Banc, or in the Alternative, Motion to Recall the Mandate Pending the Filing of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
The Second Circuit rendered its decision on March 11, 2015. I received the Order in the mail on March 17, 2014 and pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 40, the Motion for Reconsideration was due by March 25, 2014. I actually wrote this 15-page Motion in two days after I decided to scrap the Motion I was working on.
This case was destined to reach the Supreme Court, so I wasn’t too concerned about the decisions of the lower courts because I know for a fact that as a matter of law, I have proven my claims against William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig and others beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the end, it all works out because writing this Motion helped prepare me to write my petition for a writ of certiorari. If the Second Circuit is going to issue another 2 sentence Order falsely saying my appeal “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” then I asked them to issue their decision no later than April 1, 2015. I think that’s pretty reasonable since they aren’t upholding the law or discussing the facts of the case…or even providing an ethical judicial opinion which is required of an Article III federal judge in a case of this magnitude.
To Clarence and his racist white buddies in black robes on the bench: “I been waiting on [ya’ll] at the do’!” Lmao!!! (shout out to Ms. Foxy!!)
“If there’s one thing from 2014 that will define President Barack Obama’s legacy after he’s left the White House, it’s the number of lifetime judges he put on the federal bench. In its final act of the year, the Senate blew through a dozen U.S. district court nominees on Tuesday night. That puts Obama at a whopping 89 district court and circuit court confirmations for the year, and means he’ll wrap up his sixth year in office with a grand total of 305 district court and circuit court confirmations — a tally that puts him well beyond where his predecessors were by this point in their presidencies.”
As long as the dominant culture continues to believe in the myth of white superiority, nothing will change. Dichotomies (e.g. black/white, liberal/conservative, Democrat/Republican, etc.) pervade and limit Western man’s thinking. Everything is viewed as opposite and opposing, creating this superior/inferior relationship between things that really have more in common than what meets the human eye. For most of Obama’s presidency, he has ignored the problem of global white supremacy (racism) and has advanced “colorblind public policies” in our highly race conscious society. As demonstrated by the massive race-based protests occurring throughout the country present day, that strategy was clearly not the solution to the [historical] problems that have plagued this country the day Europe stepped foot on this land. Majority of those federal judges nominated by Obama’s administration will have very similar ideological views to him, particularly on the issue of race and racism. Majority will advance this “post-racial liberalism,” which downplays race and the role racism plays in the allocation of society’s benefits and its burdens. In the end, this is no better than those ideologically conservative, Republican appointed federal judges. These judges will preside in already courts that are already corrupt and overrepresented by whites/”Jews” [“Loretta Biggs will be the first black woman to serve as a district judge in North Carolina.”]. Ultimately, this means that African Americans will CONTINUE to be dealing with the same racial injustices/bullshit, particularly in America’s judicial system, that we’ve dealt with over the last 500 years. Don’t be fooled! In your spare time, research the backgrounds of these judges.
Source: Jennifer Bendery. “The Senate Just Confirmed Obama’s Judicial Legacy.” Huffington Post. December 17, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/17/obama-judicial-nominees_n_6328390.html.
“Accountability for bad appointments can be attributed to the president or governor who selects the judge.”
Source: Geoffrey P. Miller. Bad Judges. 83 Tex. L. Rev. 431, 469. December, 2004.
“The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality.”
Source: Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2203 (1988).
“Complex cases often demand untried approaches; and it is frequently in the interests of all parties that the judge keep an open mind as to how a case might be litigated or a remedy devised…[A]t the trial level, the judge ought to oversee a process in which the facts are found in an impartial and fair manner and the law is applied as set forth by the legislature or interpreted by the courts.”
Source: Geoffrey A. Miller. Bad Judges 83 Tex. L. Rev. 431, 487 2004.
“If judges are not independent, they will be subject to influence that could distort the outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract from public confidence in the judicial system.”
The independence of American trial judges interacts in a complex way with the quality of their work product. On the one hand, independence is itself a quality enhancing policy. If judges are not independent, they will be subject to influence that could distort the outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract from public confidence in the judicial system. Along this dimension, independence is positively correlated with quality. On the other hand, independence also comes with a cost. Power unchecked becomes power abused. A corporate executive who performs badly can be penalized by receiving lower compensation or suffering a demotion and must be prepared to receive criticism from others in a team setting. But in a world of perfect judicial independence, such constraints would not apply to trial judges. Even if they perform badly, they would still receive deference from lawyers who appear before them, would still retain the status, salary, and perquisites of office, and would still be emperors of their small domains. Human beings in robes, judges shirk when they can get away with it.
Source: Geoffrey A. Miller. Bad Judges 83 Tex. L. Rev. 431, 457 2004.
“Our nation’s army of judicial clerks is overwhelmingly white, not unlike the judiciary it serves. Only 14 percent of federal clerks in 2009 were minorities, according to a study that year by the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) — the last time any comprehensive survey of clerk diversity was done. Minorities fared slightly better in less prestigious state court clerkships, where they filled 18 percent of the positions.”
This was the first paragraph from Karen Sloane article “Judges Doing Something About Dearth of Diverse Clerks,” published May 12, 2014 in The National Law Journal.
Very little diversity amongst our federal judges and the administration results in very little diversity amongst those who are chosen as clerks. It’s 2014! This should be a NO BRAINER!!!! If many of these federal clerks are actually the ones writing these opinions, what impact, if any, has that played on our majority white, ideologically conservative court’s narrowed interpretation of our nation’s human rights and antidiscrimination statutes over the last 34 years [since Reagan administration]?
“The Constitution authorizes the impeachment of federal judges, but it nowhere says that they can be removed only through impeachment.”
The Constitution authorizes the impeachment of federal judges, but it nowhere says that they can be removed only through impeachment. Nor do the Constitution’s relevant provisions easily lend themselves to any such reading.
Articles I, II, and III respectively define the tenures, including the conditions that can terminate tenure, for the principal legislative, executive, and judicial officials. For example, Article I provides that a Senator’s tenure terminates upon the expiration of a six-year term, by “Resignation, or otherwise,” or (in the case of a Senator appointed to fill a vacancy) upon “the next Meeting of the [state] Legislature.” Similarly, Article III conditions a judge’s tenure on continued “good Behaviour”; the clear implication is that misbehavior can terminate a judge’s stay in office.
In addition to other tenure-terminating contingencies, Article II, Section 4 provides for impeachment as an alternative means of removal: “The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” This additional means of removal does not negate or displace other tenure-terminating provisions. Everyone concedes this point with respect to executive officials; no one thinks that because a Secretary of State can be impeached, he or she can be removed only through impeachment. There is no reason for a different conclusion with respect to judges. In fact, the impeachment provisions do not single out or even expressly mention judges: like Secretaries of State, judges are simply included in the general category of “civil officers of the United States.”
Nor does Article III’s good behavior provision suggest that it merely cross-references Article II’s impeachment provision. To the contrary, the “good Behaviour” requirement is manifestly not identical to the standard for impeachment: “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The separate standards corroborate what the natural reading of the separated impeachment and “good Behaviour” provisions already suggests, namely, that these provisions refer to independent tenure-terminating contingencies.
Those who think judges may only be removed by impeachment might suppose that history reveals that “good Behaviour” was a term of art that meant something like “tenure for life defeasible only by impeachment.” History actually proves that good behavior was independent of impeachment.
Source: Saikrishna Prakash and Steven D. Smith. Removing Federal Judges Without Impeachment. 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 95-96. 2006.
“the Constitution makes clear that federal judges do not have an absolute or a boundless independence.”
Our reading of Article III’s grant of good behavior tenure may be hard for some to swallow, especially those with muscular conceptions of judicial independence. Others, however, may embrace a more historically grounded and nuanced account of judicial independence. For example, members of Congress recently proposed an independent Inspector General for the judicial branch. Some prominent judges, including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have hinted that there is something seriously amiss with this proposal. After all, how can judges remain independent if they stand in constant fear of an Inspector General investigation?
There is nothing constitutionally suspect about government officials investigating allegations of judicial misconduct and then making reports to Congress and the executive branch. Under any reading of the Constitution, the political branches have the authority to investigate and sanction judges. The chambers of Congress can impeach, convict, and remove based on proper evidence of high crimes and misdemeanors. And whatever Congress decides, the executive may prosecute any judges whom it believes has violated the law. The proposed Inspector General would merely make it easier to prosecute and convict miscreant judges. Moreover, under our reading of good behavior, information gathered by the Inspector General also could be used to prove in court that a judge had misbehaved and had thereby violated the terms of her tenure.
But what about the cherished independence of federal judges? Too much emphasis has been laid on the independence of judges and not enough on the Constitution’s provisions that promote judicial accountability, which include the grant of life tenure subject to termination for misbehavior. Judges do enjoy a certain type of independence–they cannot be punished for the judgments they issue. But the Constitution makes clear that federal judges do not have an absolute or a boundless independence. If an Inspector General would further judicial accountability, that fact counts in favor of the Inspector General proposal.
I think it’s a good idea to have an Inspector General — and [s]he should be African American or a person of color! Lmao!!
Source: Saikrishna Prakash and Steven D. Smith. Removing Federal Judges Without Impeachment, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 95, October 18, 2006.
Me Against Iniquity: Understanding the Complexities of Global White Supremacy (Racism) Through The Eyes of an Unapologetically BLACK Intellectual 