Tagged: amici curiae

“Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court distinguishes between direct and circumstantial evidence for the purpose of proving violations of discrimination laws.”

The Court in Desert Palace emphasized the value of both direct and circumstantial evidence. “The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.'” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)).

[The Court] ha[s] often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. For instance, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), [the court] recognized that evidence that a defendant’s explanation for an employment practice is “unworthy of credence” is “one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99-100 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147). If, as Desert Palace posits, circumstantial is sometimes better suited than direct evidence to provide the most thorough account of the truth, a “direct evidence-only” rule can operate to hamper courts in search of that truth. This is especially true when “the direct evidence of a positive eyewitness can be quite undone by contradictory circumstantial evidence.”

Source: Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Asian American Justice Center;Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund; National Partnership for Women & Families; and National Women’s Law Center in Support of Petitioner in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, inc. No. 08-441.